For an indication of what the second coming of President Donald Trump might mean for Tigray, Ethiopia, and Africa, we can look back to how the US government he led reacted to the outbreak of the Tigray war in late 2020, months before his controversial term ended.
The Trump administration, instead of taking punitive action against Addis Ababa, chose instead to endorse the “law enforcement” framing chosen by the Ethiopian government, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Tibor Nagy, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and Mike Raynor, Ambassador to Ethiopia, giving a press conference and social media posts to offer tacit support.
Shockingly, both provided a justification for the entry of Eritrea to the war by accusing the TPLF of “internationalizing the conflict” when defensive action was taken by Tigray’s government in response to the Eritrean military’s incursion into the region.
This made little strategic sense. When Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, also TPLF leader, governed Ethiopia for three decades, the region was relatively peaceful. US interests were secured through the anti-terror partnerships with Ethiopia, and Ethiopian forces—many of them Tigrayan fighters turned soldiers—participated in peacekeeping missions in locations including Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, and Liberia.
Genocide Question
Despite video evidence, the entry of Eritrean forces into Tigray was denied by both the Eritrean and Ethiopian authorities, including Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. There was no statement by the US government against an incursion that ultimately, in my opinion, amounted to genocide. For Tigrayan-Americans, this was upsetting, to say the least.
Backing my view on the atrocities is the New Lines Institute report that finds the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, the Eritrean Defense Forces, and the Amhara Fano, committed genocide in Tigray. A State Department report that may have found that “acts of genocide” were committed didn’t see the light of day. This could be an area where President Trump demonstrates his departure from the previous administrations by releasing it.
It is uncertain, however, whether Trump’s team would do so. After all, his administration’s strategic focus on peace through strength and his transactional diplomacy might not prioritize human rightsissues, unless they align with broader US interests.
This also means that his administration might be more willing to overlook Eritrea’s destabilizing actions if it serves US strategic interests, particularly in countering Chinese and Russian influence. However, this could lead to increased instability in the region, affecting countries like Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia.
COHA Implementation
On 3 November 2022, a permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) was signed between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, brokered by the African Union, Kenya, South Africa, and the US. The COHA is holding up in terms of stopping the hostilities, but the implementation is far from satisfactory and the violence—including against women, the destruction of hospitals, schools and academic institutions, and the displacement of millions of people—has not been addressed.
Over 40 percent of Tigray is still under the occupation of the Amhara Fano and Eritrean forces, and, as a result, millions have been languishing in IDP camps for over four years. Sadly, neither the Ethiopian government nor the African Union have had the courage to call explicitly for Eritrean forces to leave the territories they occupy.
Although I was among those to criticize their initial approach, the Biden administration eventually played an admirable role in bringing peace. Immediately after Biden came to office, he asked Senator Chris Coons and diplomat Jeffrey Feltman to address the issue. But the key appointment was one of Feltman’s successors as envoy to the region, Mike Hammer. He shuttled between Ethiopia and foreign capitals to help find a resolution to the conflict.
Now, a renewed similarly assertive effort is needed by the Trump administration to see that the COHA is implemented.
Recognition President
Another major impact from the Trump administration could be its attitude towards the self-declared state of Somaliland. A recent article in Semafor focused on the growing expectation in Washington that the Trump administration will formally recognize Somaliland, a self-governing region within Somalia, as a state.
This could have significant implications on Tigrayan aspirations for Tigray to become an independent country. The most obvious one is precedent. Recognition could embolden Tigray’s politicians to galvanize support for Tigray’s independence, both domestically and internationally.
Such a bold move would signal to the world that the US is open to recognizing new states based on self-determination, potentially encouraging others to follow suit. According to Semafor, support for Somaliland’s independence has grown among Republican US-Africa policy leaders, right-leaning think tanks, and likely Africa advisors of Trump’s incoming White House.
Additionally, while the recognition of Somaliland could destabilize the Horn of Africa because of Mogadishu’s outrage at the move, it might also force regional powers to reconsider their positions on Tigray. Ethiopia, in particular, might face increased pressure to negotiate with Tigray and address demands for autonomy.
Meanwhile, the success of Somaliland’s democratic process and governance could serve as a model for Tigray, strengthening its case for independence.
Africa Implications
Further afield, Trump’s return to the presidency could bring a more transactional and security-focused approach to the Horn of Africa, potentially deprioritizing human rights and democracy, in favor of economic and strategic interests. This would neither serve the US national interest nor the stability of the region, home to millions of African Americans.
The region should anticipate and prepare for shifts in diplomatic engagement and increased competition with China and Russia. With regards to the impasse between Egypt and Ethiopia in Somalia, Trump’s focus may be on securing US interests, such as countering Chinese influence and ensuring regional stability. He might support Egypt’s stance on the GERD if it aligns with US goals.
The administration will likely emphasize bilateral trade agreements and economic partnerships, potentially sidelining broader multilateral initiatives. This could impact how the US engages with regional organizations like the African Union.
Just Concerns
Trump’s administration has promulgated a protectionist and America-first approach. While he has not made specific statements about the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which the Biden Administration has terminated as punitive action against the Ethiopian government, there is widespread concern among Ethiopian diaspora that he might renew the actwhen it is due for renewal in 2025.
There also could be a stronger focus on counterterrorism and security, given Trump’s previous emphasis on combating radical Islamic terrorism. This might lead to increased military cooperation and support for counterterrorism efforts in the region. Unless a careful consideration of new allies is made, this might harm peace and justice efforts in the region.
Trump’s previous administration was critical of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and even imposed sanctions on its officials. Given this stance, he might take a punitive approach towards South Africa for its role in bringing Israel to the ICC, potentially affecting long-term diplomatic relations with a leading African state. This would dampen the hope that the case of Tigray genocide would be considered by the ICC through referral by a member state.
More of the Same?
Generally, US policy towards Africa hasn’t changed much over the decades. Even at a time when there were high hopes that President Barack Obama, a US leader with African roots, would somehow fundamentally elevate the continent’s importance in Washington, US policy did not stray far from traditional orthodoxy toward Africa; i.e., braying about democracy and human rights while also pursuing national security interests that often ran contrary to its stated values.
Despite promises from the Biden administration to elevate the collective voices of Africans in global decision making and institutions, the White House has continued to fall short of its rhetoric. Africans still hold no seat at the UN Security Council, two years after Biden first agreed to it, while the US-led response to climate change, development finance, and great power competition all seem to continue to favor the Global North. If there is to be any shift, it would be to curb any influences by China and Russia.
This overpromising and under delivering reinforces the well-established reputation that Washington is an inherently unreliable—and hypocritical—partner. There is little reason to think that the second Trump administration will be any different, but its unpredictable nature provides room for some hope.
Regardless, it is essential that the incoming administration takes the peace and stability of the Horn of Africa seriously, as continuing instability in Tigray and more attacks on its people, who have a long history and are dependable allies, will not be without consequences for the wider region.